

CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK



**PROJECT COMPLETION VALIDATION REPORT
WITH MANAGEMENT RESPONSE (APPENDIX 1)**

EDUCATION FOR ALL PROJECT – HAITI

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**OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION (OIE)
MAY, 2023**

CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK



PROJECT COMPLETION VALIDATION REPORT

EDUCATION FOR ALL PROJECT – HAITI

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OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION (OIE)
MAY, 2023

CURRENCY EQUIVALENT

Dollars (\$) throughout refer to United States dollars (USD) unless otherwise stated.

USD1.00 = 40 Gourdes

Gourdes1.00 = USD0.025 Gourdes

ABBREVIATIONS

AR	Appraisal Report
BOD	Board of Directors
BMC	Borrowing Member Countries
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CSP	Country Strategy Programme
DAA	Department of Administrative Affairs
DAEPP	Direction d'Appui a l'Enseignement Prive et au Parenariat (Department for Support for Private Education and Partnership)
DAEPP	Department for Support of Private Education and Partnership
EFA	Education For All
EGRA	Early Grade Reading Assessment
ERR	Economic Rate of Return
EGRO	Economic Governance and Reform Operations
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOH	Government of Haiti
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MENFP	Ministre de l'Education Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training)
NEPO	National Education Partnership Office
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NSFP	National School Feeding Programme
NPV	Net Present Value
OIE	Office of Independent Evaluation
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PAS	Performance Assessment System
PBL	Policy Based Loans
PCR	Project Completion Report
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSR	Project Supervision Report
PTU	Project Technical Unit
SDF	Special Development Fund
SMC	School Management Committee
TA	Technical Assistance
TDD	Terminal Disbursement Date
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank

MEASURES AND EQUIVALENTS

1 metre (m)	=	3.281 feet (ft.)
1 kilometre (km)	=	0.621 mile (mi)
1 square metre (m ²)	=	10.756 square feet (ft ²)
1 square kilometre (km ²)	=	0.386 square mile (mi ²)
1 hectare (ha)	=	2.47 acres (ac)
1 tonne	=	0.98 ton (tn)
1 litre (l)	=	0.22 imperial gallons (ig)
1 cubic metre (m ³)	=	264.172 gallons (gals)
1 millimetre (mm)	=	0.039 inch (in)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROJECT SUMMARY

1. In May 2007, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) approved a grant in the amount of ten million United States dollars (USD10 mn) to the Government of the Republic of Haiti (GOH) for the Education For All Project. In December 2013, CDB approved an Additional Grant in the amount of USD10 mn in response to the disruption of education services caused by an earthquake that devastated the country in January 2010. There was a counterpart contribution of USD2.50 mn.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

2. The project's overall objective was to contribute to social and economic development through a better-educated population. The goal was to increase access to primary education for disadvantaged children by: (a) strengthening public and non-public sector partnerships, (b) enhancing school management capabilities to increase access, and (c) improving equity and monitoring learning outcomes at the primary level.

PROJECT BACKGROUND

3. At appraisal, the need for improving primary education was established as a key condition for achieving economic growth. It was observed that no country has ever reached sustained growth without first having reached universal or close to universal primary education. Primary education in particular was viewed to have many additional beneficial effects on nutrition, health, fertility levels and empowerment. The key focus of this project was to contribute to the achievement of the Education for All goal by 2015, as well as the targets of education-related millennium development goals (MDGs). It was also consistent with CDB's strategic objectives of fostering inclusive social development by improving the quality and access to education and training.

EVALUATION CRITERIA

4. The assessment focused on the project's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and CDB's and the Borrower's performance.

Relevance

5. The Project Completion Report (PCR) rates Relevance as **Highly Satisfactory**. The project was seen as a high priority by GOH as it considered education as one of the key conditions for achieving economic growth. The Appraisal Report (AR) states that the project was highly relevant because GOH recognized that investment in education is one of the main actions to reduce poverty in Haiti. The Haitian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper individuated education as key in helping households manage risks and shocks when they occur. Shocks usually result in the withdrawal of children from schools because of the difficulty in paying school fees, uniforms, books, and other expenses. The AR further indicated that the project's outputs are critical in the contribution to poverty reduction in Haiti in the short, medium, and long term. Considering the previous, the Evaluator concurs with the PCR's rating of **Highly Satisfactory**.

Effectiveness

6. The PCR gives a rating of **Unsatisfactory** for Effectiveness. Only one of the outcome indicators was achieved by the end of the project (Table 3). The outcome indicator "2000 accredited schools, revised downwards from 5,000 after earthquake in 2010" was not achieved by the end of the project. The other indicator "Results of literacy tests are utilised by schools to improve learning outcomes by 2012" was only partially achieved as an alternative literacy test was implemented two years after the original appraisal date.

“The Multi-grade pilot programme” was not implemented. The only target that was achieved was the school mapping database although one year late. After careful review, the Evaluator concurs with the PCR’s rating of **Unsatisfactory**.

Efficiency

7. The PCR assesses the cost efficiency of the project as **Satisfactory**. The project benefits were expected to outweigh the project costs. The project focused on increasing access to primary education. Research findings indicate that the greatest returns to education are at the primary level. The project components represent the least cost options for achieving the short and long-term objectives.

8. The PCR indicates there was an additional grant of USD10 mn and the total sum of money disbursed from CDB for project completion was USD20 mn. This additional grant was to help facilitate costs in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake when GOH sought to respond to the needs of the education sector in Haiti, reallocating resources to respond better to the immediate needs of the sector. Specifically, the revised project allowed for an increased number of beneficiaries of the school feeding and students’ subsidies programme and additional institutional support to the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP).

9. Overall, project implementation suffered delays of 30 months and obtained 2 extensions. These delays were attributed both to the delays of the first disbursement (17 months of delay occurred to satisfy the conditions precedent to First Disbursement) and the 2010 earthquake. The delays in satisfying conditions precedent were experienced in securing the Legal Opinion, the signing of the Grant Agreement and the completion of the Designation of Representatives form.

10. By referring to the PAS Manual 2013, the Evaluator rates this criterion as **Marginally Unsatisfactory** due to the inefficiencies occurred at project implementation level and the consequent delays.

Sustainability

11. The PCR rates the sustainability of the project as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**. The planned activities and their spin-offs were highly relevant at appraisal. The grant to alleviate the cost of basic education for families and the nutrition/health programme had a major impact on school attendance. However, these interventions were costly, and the national budget could not support them in the short term. These actions required additional support from financial backers over several years until the GOH can completely take over the reins, the same applies to the training of student teachers.

12. The PCR also states that institutional strengthening requires long-term support. At the end of phase 1 of EFA, contrary to forecasts, the Department of Administrative Affairs (DAA) was unable to single-handedly take over the financial management and procurement processes.

13. The PCR highlighted that the renovation work and supply of equipment could only create a lasting impact if accompanied by support for management and maintenance, and if the necessary financial resources were made available otherwise there would be a risk that the equipment may be damaged through misuse or poor maintenance.

14. Based on the previous, the Evaluator rates Sustainability as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**, which concurs with the PCR rating.

Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency

15. The PCR rates the performance of the Borrower/Implementation Agency as **Satisfactory**. The justification for the rating is that the tuition subsidy and school feeding programmes had support at the highest level of government with the President expanding the tuition subsidy programme to a nationwide level and initiating legislation to fund both programmes. The Ministry of Finance provided satisfactory support to the project and was flexible and committed, demonstrating their willingness to process the additional grant funding for the project.

16. After a slow start, project officials were able to establish routines that allowed for the completion of project activities. The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) kept satisfactory records of beneficiaries, even though data was generally not disaggregated by sex. The Comite de Pilotage did not function as planned, and only a few meetings were held. There were major delays in satisfying the conditions precedent. The Evaluator rates the Borrower's performance as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**, due to the delays in meeting grant effectiveness requirements.

Performance of the Caribbean Development Bank

17. The PCR provides a self-assessment rating of CDB's performance as **Satisfactory**. CDB recognized its shortcomings in relation to language and limited human resource capacity and therefore extended its partnership with the World Bank (WB) to supervise project activities on its behalf. A strong collaborative relationship was developed.

18. The Evaluator rates CDB's performance as **Satisfactory**, particularly in light of the excellent collaboration between CDB and WB, in terms of the supervision of project activities.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

19. The PCR rates the overall performance of the project as **Satisfactory**. The Evaluator rates the overall project performance as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**. This rating is based on an arithmetic average of the total scores from separate assessments of the four core criteria: Relevance (Highly Satisfactory); Effectiveness (Unsatisfactory); Efficiency (Marginally Unsatisfactory); and Sustainability (Marginally Unsatisfactory).

20. Details of the ratings and justification for differences between the PCR and Evaluator are summarised below.

SUMMARY RATINGS OF CORE EVALUATION CRITERIA AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROJECT

Criteria	PCR¹	OIE Review	Reason, if any, for Disagreement/Comments
Relevance	High Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	
Effectiveness	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Efficiency	Satisfactory	Marginally unsatisfactory	Inefficiencies at implementation contributed to significant delays in the implementation of the intervention.
Sustainability	Marginally Unsatisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	
Composite (Aggregate) Performance Rating	Satisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Delays in meeting grant effectiveness requirements impacted the timing of implementation.
CDB Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of PCR	N/A	Satisfactory	

Lessons:

- (a) Demand-driven interventions can work well in achieving greater access to education and offer good opportunities for upscaling project activities in countries where the provision of public services is limited. With the dominance of private schools in Haiti, the subsidization of primary school tuition and providing school meals removed two of the most critical obstacles that students faced to attending class. Allowing schools to nominate children for the tuition subsidy proved to be an effective way to tap the excess demand for primary education and to target poorer students.
- (b) Donor coordination was critical in a fragile state whose institutions may not have been able to programme efficiently all of the aid available to them. In EFA-1, one of the most important contributions was the coordination of the large number of resources available to education in Haiti. EFA-1 was able to take on additional donor funding that was necessary to upscale the successful tuition subsidy and nutrition programmes. Haiti's education sector might not have been able to effectively absorb the large influx of resources were it not for the design of EFA-1.
- (c) Achieving quick wins in a fragile state may have necessitated Project Coordination Unit (PCU) oriented project management. GOH wanted quick wins in the education sector in

¹ PPES scores and ratings used in PCR and PSRs to be converted to PAS 2013 scores and ratings, using the equivalence matrix in the relevant PAS 2013 Manual (Public Sector Investment Lending and TA; PBL; CSP).

part to demonstrate that the government could deliver important social services; however, its institutions were weak. With Haiti also highly susceptible to natural disasters, it made sense to concentrate Project management in a small unit of experienced, well-qualified professionals that was well-positioned to continue Project activities. This PCU was also key in effectively channeling the additional resources that were available to the Project from other donors after the earthquake. However, as was the case in EFA-1, it is essential that the PCU remain under the authority of the ministry and follow the ministry's strategy and objectives.

- (d) Outsourcing the provision of basic services was seen to be an effective form of implementation in a fragile state. EFA-1 expanded the use of NGOs for school nutrition and School Management Committees (SMC) capacity building and partnered with non-public schools to improve school access. GOH itself could not have as effectively delivered these basic education and nutrition services.
- (e) Provision of school nutrition was important to encouraging attendance. Focus groups of parents reported that the provision of early morning snacks and lunches at school was one of the main reasons that they sent their children to school. Punctuality and regularity therefore increased. Some parents said that on some days of the week, the school lunch is the only balanced meal their children eat.
- (f) If capacity cannot be built as quickly as planned, other capacities in-country may be available to implement project activities. When the SMCs could not provide the "use of funds" reports on which the tuition subsidies were based, the project was able to rely on local technical audit capacity to verify compliance with the subsidy programme. The establishment of a PCU staffed with capable consultants (as part of the 2009 restructuring) greatly boosted project implementation. More importantly, after the earthquake that devastated MENFP, the PCU served as a critical source of capacity and performed important ministerial tasks that kept project activities moving forward.

1. BASIC PROJECT DATA

Project Title	Education For All Project
Country	Republic of Haiti
Sector	Education
Grant No.	GA1/HA1
Beneficiary	Government of the Republic of Haiti (GOH)
Implementing/Executing Agency	Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP)

<u>Disbursements (\$ mn)</u>	<u>CDB GRANT</u>		
	<u>OCR</u>	<u>SFR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Grant Amount	-	20,000,000	20,000,000
Disbursed	-	20,000,000	20,000,000
Cancelled	-	-	-
<u>Project Milestones</u>	<u>At Appraisal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (months)</u>
Board Approval	May 28, 2007	May 28, 2007	0
Grant Agreement signed	January 31, 2008	January 31, 2008	0
Grant Effectiveness ²	October 1, 2007	March 23, 2009	17
<u>CDB Grant</u>	<u>At Appraisal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (months)</u>
First Disbursement Date	October 31, 2007	November 1, 2009	24
Terminal Disbursement Date	March 31, 2011	April 26, 2013	24
TDD Extensions (number)	-	2	2
<u>Project Cost and Financing (\$ mn)</u>	<u>At Appraisal³</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (mn)</u>
CDB Grant	10,000,000	20,000,000	10,000,000
Counterpart	6,500,000	2,500,000	-4,000,000
Co-financing (World Bank & CIDA)	25,000,000	42,233,000	17,233,000
Total	41,500,000	64,733,000	23,233,000
<u>Implementation</u>	<u>At Appraisal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (months)</u>
Start Date ⁴	September 1, 2007	June 30, 2009	21
Completion Date	September 30, 2010	March 30, 2013	30
Implementation Period (years)	3	3.9	9

² Date Conditions to First Disbursement satisfied.

³ These figures refer to the financial plan as indicated in the Paper BD 21/07.

⁴ Implementation begins with signing of Loan/Grant Agreement.

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Rationale

2.01 The education system in Haiti was characterized by low enrolment rates at all levels with approximately 40 percent (%) of primary school-age children not enrolled in school. The system was also under-resourced and of low quality with limited access at all levels including early childhood, primary, secondary and tertiary. The 2002-03 education census showed that education services are provided mainly by private providers, with the State providing access to less than 20% of the eligible population at the primary level. About 75%, which was a large percentage of the non-public schools, lacked certification and licensing.

2.02 Education inequality was also clearly observed in the system, with Haiti having the highest rate of inequality in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. While the levels of education access and quality were generally low in Haiti, it was particularly observed amongst the poor and to a greater extent in women. The low and inequitable access resulted from mostly private provision, the high cost of tuition fees and the absence of appropriate facilities, especially in rural areas. It was estimated that poor families spent about 40% of their income on tuition for primary education at non-public institutions. The Living Conditions Measurement Survey revealed that 43% of parents (50% of lowest-income parents) did not send their children to school because of the costs of tuition fees, books, uniforms and transportation. As a consequence, dropout rates were high and a limited number of children transitioned to the secondary level.

2.03 The low levels of education in Haiti's population perpetuate poverty and the persistence of social problems. A fundamental strategy for poverty reduction was determined to be to provide basic education for all. Haiti's EFA Strategy emphasised the need for concerted efforts to achieve EFA goals by 2015. The Strategy aimed to remove barriers to access to primary education for more than 500,000 children between the ages of 6 and 12 and to improve the quality of education. Equally important was the need to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training to manage the system, including the capacity to analyse learning outcomes; and to engage communities in promoting and sustaining the EFA goals. Close partnership with the already active private sector in achieving EFA goals remained imperative; however, appropriate mechanisms needed to be instituted to strengthen collaboration for policy dialogue, education sector planning, and monitoring and evaluation.

2.04 In 2010 a devastating earthquake severely impacted the education sector. Education participation declined not only because of the damage to infrastructure but also as a consequence of the upheavals that families faced as they attempted to achieve their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. GOH recognised the urgency of restoring the school system as quickly as possible to "normalise" the lives of young persons who were deeply traumatised by the event and in collaboration with the international donor community formulated a three-phase plan of action to restore some level of normalcy. In the immediate term, the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) emphasised the need to maintain school enrolment by providing school infrastructure demolition, clearing and establishment of temporary structures, and provision of schoolbooks, kits and school materials and school fees subsidies.

Expected Impact

2.05 The project aimed to (i) increase access to primary education by poor children; (ii) strengthen public and non-public sector partnerships, and enhance school management capabilities to improve quality and monitor learning outcomes at the primary level.

Objectives and Expected Outcomes

2.06 The project's overall objective was to contribute to social and economic development through a better-educated population.

The expected outcomes were to:

- (a) Increase access to primary education for less fortunate children – 2,000 additional accredited schools by the end (2015).
- (b) Strengthen public and non-public sector partnerships – Results of literacy tests are utilised by schools to improve learning outcomes by 2012.
- (c) Enhance school management capabilities to increase access, improve equity and monitor learning outcomes at the primary level – (a) Multi-grade/multi-level pilot programme assessed and findings disseminated by 2012; (b) GIS school mapping database utilised in decision-making by 2014.

Components and/or Outputs

Components

2.07 The Project had four components:

- (a) Improved Access to Primary Education:
 - (i) Primary Education per Student Subsidies - Subsidies of \$90 per student to allow poor girls and boys not enrolled in school to attend non-public schools.
 - (ii) Pre-Service Teacher Professional Development - Improvement of the production capacity of the Haitian pre-service teacher professional development system.
 - (iii) Strengthening of School Management Committees - Training and technical support to SMCs to enhance their capacity to manage *more effectively*.
- (b) Improved Quality of Primary Education:
 - (i) Multigrade Learning Programmes - to be piloted in 200 primary schools.
 - (ii) Student Nutrition and Health - school feeding and de-worming of children in primary schools and institutional strengthening of the National School Feeding Programme (NSFP) department.
 - (iii) Improved Student Literacy Skills - Provision of Creole language and standard French textbooks to supplement existing French resources and assessment of students at the end of Grade 2.
 - (iv) Improved Governance of MENFP: Training and technical assistance (TA) to enhance governance and improve coordination between Central and Regional Departments. The establishment of the National Education Partnership Office (NEPO) to provide the institutional structure for policy dialogue, strategic planning, and operational collaboration between the public and non-public education stakeholders.

The school subsidy and the school feeding programmes operated in seven of the nine Departments of Haiti.⁵

⁵ The South-East and South-West Departments have not been targeted for project interventions given the number of other programmes being implemented in those locations.

- (c) Improved Governance of MENFP
 - (i) Training in financial management, procurement, and education planning.
 - (ii) Provision of computer equipment.
 - (iii) The establishment of NEPO.
 - (iv) Technical support in the areas of planning, curriculum development and monitoring and evaluation.
 - (v) Provision of transportation support
- (d) Project Coordination and Evaluation
 - (i) Impact evaluation of quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the impact of subsidy on beneficiary households and schools.
 - (ii) 20% difference between the unit cost of the NSFP and that of the average unit cost of the three largest NGO school feeding providers.

Outputs (Table 2)

- (a) Improved Access to Primary Education
 - (i) 390,000 children revised from 210,000 in 2010 following the earthquake.
 - (ii) At least 3,600 new teachers receive pre-service teacher education.
 - (iii) Original 500 schools, changed to 1,010 after restructuring.
 - (iv) At least 80% of beneficiary schools submit use of funds reports to DAEPP and/or NEPO. (public/private partnership).
- (b) Improved Quality of Primary Education
 - (a) 70,000 students changed to 210,000 after restructuring.
 - (b) 86 schools. Indicator revised downwards from 200 after 2010 restructuring.
 - (c) Multi-Age Learning Programme implemented in at least 100 schools.
- (c) Improved Governance of MENFP
 - (a) Training in financial management, procurement, and education planning.
 - (b) Provision of computer equipment.
 - (c) The establishment of NEPO.
 - (d) Technical support in the areas of planning, curriculum development and monitoring and evaluation.
 - (e) Provision of transportation support.

Provision of Inputs

2.07 In May 2007, CDB approved a Grant in the amount of USD10 million (mn) to GOH to assist in improving access to primary education for poor children whilst improving equity, quality, and governance of the education sector. In December 2010, CDB approved an Additional Grant in the amount of USD10 mn. This Additional Grant was to assist GOH in financing the revised expanded scope of the EFA Project, which sought to respond to the needs of the education sector in Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake. GOH requested a reallocation of resources to target specific components deemed necessary to respond better to the immediate needs of the sector. The Additional Grant brought the total contribution of CDB to USD20 mn. Counterpart Resources contribution was USD2.5 mn and the total Co-Financing from

World Bank and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) combined amounted to USD42.23 mn. Tabulated summary of the project cost and financing plan estimated at appraisal (refer to Table 1 below).

**TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING
ESTIMATED AT APPRAISAL⁶
(\$'000)**

Item	CDB SFR		CDB % Difference	Counterpart & Co-Financing		Counterpart % Difference
	Planned USD'000	Actual USD'000		Planned USD'000	Actual USD'000	
1. Improved Access to Primary Education						
a. Primary Education per Student Subsidy	3,200	11,800	268.8	15,900	28,200	77.36
b. Tools, workshop equipment, and learning materials	1,000	1,600	60	7,500	3,000	-60
c. Strengthening of School Management Committees	-	-	-	1,600	1,400	-12.5
Total Improved Access to Primary Education	4,200	13,400	219.1	25,000	32,600	30.4
2. Improved Quality of Primary Education						
a. Multi-grade Learning Programmes	1,300	-	-100	1,300	700	-46.15
b. Student Nutrition and Health	3,100	5,000	61.3	1,700	6,400	276.47
c. Improved Student Literacy	900	400	-55.56	-	-	
Total Improved Quality of Primary Education	5,300	5,400	1.9	3,000	7,100	136.67
3. Improved Governance of MENFP						
a. Central MENFP Fiduciary/DHR	-	400	400	300	1,300	333.33
b. National Education Partnership Office	500	0	-100	300	-	-100
c. Central Technical Departments	-	-	-	300	500	66.67
Total Improved Governance of MENFP	500	400	-20	900	1,800	100
4. Project Coordination and Evaluation						
a. Project Coordination	0	800	800	1,000	1,800	80
b. Evaluation	-	-	-	500	400	-20
Total Project Coordination and Evaluation	0	800	0	1,500	2,200	60
5. Project Preparation Facility (PPF) Repayments	-	-	-	1,000	1,000	0
Total Project Preparation Facility Repayments				1,000	1,000	0
Total Project Cost:	10,000	20,000	100	31,400	44,700	0

Implementation Arrangements

Executing Agency

2.08 The Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training) (MENFP) had overall responsibility for administering and managing all aspects of the project.

⁶ Appraisal Document Page 10. Due to the lack of exact values being provided in the PCR and AR, the figures for the Planned and Actual in Table 1 have been rounded off to the nearest 100 value.

Identification of Risks and Mitigation Measures⁷

2.09 One of the most significant risks, identified at appraisal, was low project implementation capacity given that the Department of Administrative Affairs (DAA) was inexperienced in managing external donor funds. The project recognized that additional strain was being placed on the limited capacity of DAA and sought to mitigate this risk through strengthening the department. The project provided USD1 mn aimed to strengthen the Project Preparation Facility (PPF) to finance a comprehensive and rapid fiduciary capacity-building programme, including institutional strengthening, equipment, training and office rehabilitation. These activities were to be completed before the project implementation commenced, thereby enabling DAA to fulfil its role.

2.10 Another risk identified at appraisal was the School Management Committee(s) (SMCs) being late in submitting per student subsidy reports to DAA. This risk would have obstructed subsequent subsidy disbursements and slowed down the implementation and financial execution of the project. This risk was mitigated through intensive capacity-building training for over 500 SMCs each year. NGOs with demonstrated experience in this area were contracted to provide the training.

2.11 At appraisal one technical risk was the short length of teacher training which could have diminished the expected results or benefits. To mitigate this risk, the project provided complementary activities in ongoing teacher professional development after new teachers had been deployed to the classroom. This component was implemented in collaboration with professional development experts, Haitian teachers' associations, and other development agencies.

2.12 Another major operational risk was that the elite would have tried to capture funds targeted for out-of-school children of poor families. This risk was mitigated by independent social audits of subsidies transferred to SMCs.

2.13 The inappropriate use of the subsidy programme by non-public school directors and/or SMCs and NEPO staff was also a concern. The project sought to mitigate this risk by ensuring a multi-stakeholder composition of the NEPO Board, a detailed operational manual, civil society monitoring of the subsidy awards, and the engagement of an external audit firm to track the use of subsidy disbursements.

3. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Relevance of Design and Formulation

3.01 At appraisal, the need for improving primary education was established as a key condition for achieving economic growth. It was observed that no country has ever reached sustained growth (5% per year, net of population growth) without first having reached universal or close to universal primary education. Primary education in particular was viewed to have many additional beneficial effects on nutrition, health, fertility levels, and empowerment. The key focus of this project was to achieve the goal of education for all by 2015, as well as the targets of education-related MDGs. It was also consistent with CDB's strategic objectives of fostering inclusive social development by improving the quality and opportunities for access to education and training.

3.02 The AR indicated that the project was expected to make a significant contribution in addressing some of the major constraints experienced by GOH in delivering education services, particularly to the poor. Public sector spending on education in Haiti was calculated at 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the financial year 2006/07 (compared to the other English-speaking Caribbean at 6.5%). Apart from

⁷ Appraisal Document Page 30.

being a relatively low proportion of GDP, the total recurrent public education spending for the financial year 2006/07 was slightly less than \$100 mn, which was about 11% of the total government budget, well below the average of 25% for other low-income countries and about half of the qualification benchmark of 20% for the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI). In terms of sub-sectoral distribution, less than 50% went to primary education. Eighty-five percent of spending went to teachers' emoluments with very little left for qualitative inputs such as textbooks and improvement of the learning environment. Total spending per student had been estimated at \$45 per student (low compared to sub-Saharan African standards at \$125 per student). Compared to government spending, household spending on education was high. On average, households spent about \$120 for each child per year on primary education with upper-income households spent as much as three times the amount of lower-income households. School fees were seen as the primary cost, followed by educational materials and uniforms. GOH committed to significantly increase the spending on primary education (and had done so in 2007); however, its starting point was low and there was strong sectoral competition for very scarce resources.

Project Outputs

3.03 At appraisal the project was scheduled to be implemented over three years (September 1, 2007, to September 30, 2010). The CDB grant was expected to have been fully disbursed by March 31, 2011. The PCR indicates that the project was implemented over three years and nine months, from June 30, 2009 to March 30, 2013. CDB's first grant disbursement was on November 1, 2009, the grant was fully disbursed by April 26, 2013 (approximately 24 months behind schedule).

3.04 The PCR assesses the performance of the project in terms of achievement of outputs as **Satisfactory**. The PCR indicates that improving access to and the quality of primary education through the tuition subsidy programme were the largest components and these targets were met and exceeded in some instances. However, the subsidy programme was originally designed to be implemented as a two-tranche disbursement, but due to the extended time frame after appraisal, a three-tranche system had to be accepted. This was largely due to SMCs not submitting enrolment data in a timely manner to facilitate disbursements.

3.05 The PCR states that outputs achieved for Component 1, "Improved Access to Primary Education", were **Satisfactory**. Targets were exceeded after upward revision. The tuition subsidy programme was valuable post-earthquake as it was a pre-established mechanism to mitigate the impact of earthquakes on families. However, the original tuition subsidy disbursement process did not function well and therefore had to be modified during project implementation. SMCs were still incapable of producing financial reports in a timely manner and needed substantially more time and resources to build the necessary capacity to do so. The PCR also stated there were serious delays in disbursing the tuition subsidies. Many schools reported that they received the grants when the school year was more than half over. The delays in the tuition payments caused hardships for the schools because teachers were paid months late, textbooks could only be purchased on credit and, in some cases, school rehabilitation had to be stopped for months.

3.06 The PCR mentions that the output achieved for Component 2, "Improved Quality of Primary Education", was **Satisfactory**. The revised target was largely but not fully met. The target of 200 was reduced to 86 schools because of higher than anticipated costs and capacity constraints within MENFP which resulted in fewer EFA-subsidised and nonsubsidised schools participating than projected. The Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA) and Capacity Building provided a basis to assess primary student learning outcomes and was the first assessment of its kind in Haiti. Although the number of schools participating was reduced from 200 to 86, this number was adequate to provide a meaningful baseline for assessment.

3.07 The PCR rated the output achieved for Component 3, "Improved Governance of MENFP" as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**. NEPO was to oversee Public Private Partnerships but this was never

operationalised due to capacity constraints and a lack of political commitment. Although Parliament adopted a law authorising the establishment of NEPO on September 10, 2007, there were conflicting views over who would have the power to decide which schools should receive tuition subsidies, negatively impacting efforts to establish NEPO. The student subsidy programme continued to be implemented by DAEPP, in accordance with the Project’s contingency plan, but due to the restructuring in 2010, the DAAs, DDEs, and the PCU had many difficulties compensating for the absence of NEPO. The transmission of “use of funds” reports from schools to the PCU was time intensive, and the PCU was not able to process “use of funds” reports adequately, delaying the disbursements of the tuition subsidies which were at the heart of the Project.

3.08 The PCR assessed the output achieved for Component 4, “Project Coordination and Evaluation”, as **Unsatisfactory**. None of the expectations were met. There was no evaluation done because of capacity issues and complications due to the earthquake. There was also insufficient data available for an evaluation because no randomised surveys were conducted.

3.09 Project management was not considered successful by the PCR, largely due to the 2010 earthquake which occurred mid-way through the project and destroyed the majority of MENFP’s office infrastructure. There were delays in signing agreements with schools and NGOs for providing school nutrition services, and the GOH was unable to overcome political obstacles in appointing the Director General and managing staff of NEPO.

3.10 Based on a review of the information available on CDB’s Registry files and PSRs, the Evaluator concurs with the findings of the PCR with respect to the implementation of the project. Nonetheless, most of the expected outputs were completed, sometimes exceeding targets, albeit over a protracted period, some 30 months beyond the scheduled completion date.

Table 2: Matrix of Project Outputs

No.	Planned Outputs at Appraisal	Outputs Achieved (at project end)	Evaluator’s Rating
1.	Improved Access to Primary Education		S
	(a) 390,000 children revised from 210,000 in 2010 following the earthquake. (b) At least 3,600 new teachers receive pre-service teacher education. (c) Original 500 schools, changed to 1,010 after restructuring. (d) At least 80% of beneficiary schools submit use of funds reports to DAEPP and/or NEPO. (public/private partnership).	(a) 425,000 children benefitted from primary education enrolment subsidies. (b) 3,066 teachers were trained. The sub-component was affected by the late payment/non-payment of the stipend (counterpart contribution). (c) 1,212 accredited non-public schools received per student subsidies which were allocated by multi-stakeholder committees (public/private partnership). (d) 76% of beneficiary schools submitted the use of funds reports to DAEPP and/or NEPO.	

No.	Planned Outputs at Appraisal	Outputs Achieved (at project end)	Evaluator's Rating
2.	Improved Quality of Primary Education		S
	(a) 70,000 students changed to 210,000 after restructuring. (b) 86 schools. Indicator revised downwards from 200 after the 2010 restructuring. (c) Multi-Age Learning Programme implemented in at least 100 schools.	(a) 260,000 students participated in integrated nutrition/health programme (quality) by 2012. (b) 84 schools completed the Grade 2 literacy competency test. (c) The Multi-Age Learning Programme was not implemented.	
3.	Improved Governance of MENFP		MUS
	(a) Training in financial management, procurement, and education planning (b) Provision of computer equipment (c) The establishment of NEPO (d) Technical support in the areas of planning, curriculum development and monitoring and evaluation. (e) Provision of transportation support	(a) Training completed. (b) Assistance was given with the development of a Human Resource Database. GOH was supported in the preparation of an Action Plan. (c) NEPO was not established. (d) Support was provided to DAEPP and the Planning Department in the areas of planning, monitoring and evaluation and development of teaching/learning guides. (e) Provision of 100 motorcycles for School Inspectors and 11 four-wheel drive vehicles to Technical Directors.	
4.	Project Coordination and Evaluation		US
	(a) Impact evaluation of quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the impact of subsidy on beneficiary households and schools. (b) 20% difference between the unit cost of the NSFP and that of the average unit cost of the three largest NGO school feeding providers.	(a) Impact evaluation not completed. (b) Calculation of percentage difference not completed.	
Overall Rating			MUS

Project Cost, Disbursements, Borrower Contribution and Conformance to Schedule

Project Cost

3.11 Accounting for the variation in costs approved through the additional Grant (Paper BD 21/07 Add. 1), the estimated cost of the project including co-financing at appraisal was USD64.7 mn, and the actual cost was USD64.7 mn, with a variance of 0%. The PCR indicated that CDB's SFR funds were fully

disbursed in the amount of USD20 mn. A summary of project costs/commitments and the financing plan is presented in Table 1.

Disbursements

3.12 At appraisal, the first disbursement was planned to be made by October 31, 2007, and the Grant was intended to be fully disbursed by March 31, 2011. According to the PCR, the first disbursement was made on November 1, 2009 (24 months late) and the last disbursement was made on April 26, 2013 (24 months later than planned). The Terminal Disbursement Date (TDD) was extended two times.

Borrower Contribution

3.13 GOH's contribution was lower than planned during the appraisal phase, USD2.5 mn rather than USD6.5 mn. The total co-financing from the World Bank and CIDA amounted to USD42.23 mn.

Conformance to Schedule

3.14 At appraisal, the Grant was planned to be implemented, commencing in September 2007, and ending in September 2010. The PCR states that the project commenced in June 2009 (24 months later than planned) and was completed 30 months later than the initial end date, in March 2013.

Implementation Arrangements, Conditions and Covenants and Related TA.

Implementation Arrangements

3.15 The project was implemented by MENFP. GOH chose to strengthen one of its existing units within its Ministry rather than establish a separate implementing mechanism. The project was implemented in close partnership with the World Bank, which was responsible for the overall project supervision. CDB used the same project implementation procedures, including harmonised fiduciary arrangements, project reporting procedures, and audits. It was anticipated that the project would also be implemented in partnership with EFA and FTI, which by design involved all major education donors.

3.16 The project was monitored using a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Coordinator Specialist in the Project Technical Unit (PTU). The Specialist was primarily responsible for tracking all key project indicators and triggers, providing quarterly reports to the Project Advisory Committee (PAC) which was to take any necessary actions to improve project implementation. The PCR indicates that, initially, the implementation arrangements were less effective due to the lack of ownership at the MENFP level. However, the restructuring of a new PCU in 2010 improved implementation with concrete positive effects on the tuition subsidy transfers to schools.

Conditions and Covenants

3.17 The compliance of the Borrower/Executing Agency with the conditions of the Grant Agreement was achieved in March 2009 rather than September 2007 as scheduled at appraisal. The PCR did not indicate the reason for the grant disbursement delays.

Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilisation

3.18 The AR specifies the list of reports to be prepared during and after project implementation. These reports included: statements of expenditure, bank reconciliation statements, quarterly unaudited financial

management reports, quarterly interim status reports, monthly progress reports, tender evaluation reports by M&E specialist, quarterly reports on investments, audited financial statements including statements on the primary education student subsidy component, integrated technical and financial reports on primary education per student subsidy component, impact evaluation of the primary education per student subsidy component, annual reports indicating student enrolment and student enrolment data submitted by SMCs. GOH appointed an M&E Specialist to monitor and report on the implementation and progress. The M&E system that was developed involved PAC, PTU, MENFP Office, and DAA. Additionally, CDB extended its partnership with WB by formally engaging WB to supervise project activities on its behalf. A strong collaborative relationship was developed.

4. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE (PCR ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION)

4.01 The following are the ratings of the PCR and PSRs over the project implementation period, and the Evaluator's ratings based on the data reviewed.

Relevance

4.02 The PCR rates Relevance as **Highly Satisfactory**. The project was seen as a high priority by GOH as it considered Education as one of the key conditions for achieving economic growth. Statistics have shown that no country has reached sustained growth (5% per year, net of population growth) without first having reached universal or close to universal primary education. Primary education was observed to have many additional beneficial effects on nutrition, health, fertility levels, and empowerment of girls. These factors also aligned with CDB's strategic objectives of fostering inclusive social development by improving the quality and opportunities for access to education and training. The AR states that the project was highly relevant because GOH recognized that Haiti is regarded as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and education levels are very low. GOH also recognized that investment in education is one of the main actions that can reduce poverty in Haiti. The Haitian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) highlights education as key in helping households manage risks and shocks when they occur. Shocks usually result in the withdrawal of children from schools because of the difficulty in paying school fees, uniforms, books, and other expenses. The AR further indicates that the outputs of this project would be critical in the contribution to poverty reduction in Haiti in the short, medium, and long term. The Evaluator concurs with the PCR's rating of **Highly Satisfactory**.

Effectiveness

4.03 The PCR gives a rating of **Unsatisfactory** for Effectiveness. Only one of the outcome indicators (Table 3) was achieved by the end of the project. The outcome indicator "2000 accredited schools, revised downwards from 5,000 after earthquake in 2010" was not achieved by the end of the project. The other indicator "Results of literacy tests are utilised by schools to improve learning outcomes by 2012" was only partially achieved as an alternative literacy test was implemented two years after the original appraisal date. "The Multi-grade pilot programme" was not implemented. The only target that was achieved according to plan was the school mapping database although one year late. After a careful review of Table 3, the Evaluator concurs with the PCR's rating of **Unsatisfactory**.

Efficiency

4.04 The PCR assesses the efficiency of the project as **Satisfactory**. The AR stated that project benefits outweighed costs. At appraisal, the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) for the three first components was estimated to be 17%, and the Net Present Value (NPV) at a rate of return of 12% is estimated at \$16.3. The key inputs for the estimate of economic benefits were the number of children participating in each subcomponent (student subsidies, school feeding, multi-age programme) and the average additional

education attainment (years of schooling) achieved by each child, the private returns to education, and the base income. This data has not been confirmed by the PCR given the dearth of market data and the difficulty in measuring benefits for this level of education. The assessment of efficiency provided by the PCR is qualitative in nature.

4.05 The school subsidy programme experienced several delays during the original tuition subsidy disbursement and needed to be modified during project implementation. This was influenced by the fact that (i) despite Project-financed training sessions, SMCs were still incapable of producing financial reports in a timely manner and needed substantially more time and resources to build the necessary capacity to do so; (ii) there were serious delays in disbursing the tuition subsidies, even for the first tranche, with many schools reporting that they received the grants when the school year was more than half over. The delays in the tuition payments caused hardships for the schools because teachers were paid late, textbooks could only be purchased on credit, and school rehabilitation often had to be stopped for months. Several schools reported that they never received a second tranche. The explanation given later by the PCU was that some schools had overstated the number of students who were eligible for the tuition subsidy, which led to an overestimate of the amount of the first tranche; hence the reason for the absence of, or a significant reduction in a second tranche.

Table 3: Matrix of Project Outcomes

No.	Planned Outcomes at Appraisal	Outcomes Achieved (at project end)	Evaluator's Rating
1	<p>Baseline: N/A</p> <p>2000 accredited schools, revised downwards from 5,000 after the earthquake in 2010</p> <p>Results of literacy tests are utilised by schools to improve learning outcomes by 2012.</p> <p>Multi-grade/multilevel pilot programme assessed and findings disseminated by 2012.</p> <p>GIS school mapping database utilised in decision-making by 2014</p>	<p>N/A</p> <p>Not implemented.</p> <p>An alternative reading proficiency programme started in 2014 with students of the first year of subsidised schools and continuing with the participation of 290 schools involving 9,911 students (4,604 females and 5,307 males).</p> <p>The multi-grade pilot programme was not implemented.</p> <p>Completed and utilised by MENP in 2015. (The school map is available on the MENFP's website.)</p>	<p>US</p> <p>US</p> <p>MUS</p> <p>US</p> <p>S</p>
Overall Rating			US

4.06 Notwithstanding the issues, the 2010 restructuring eased the disbursement problem by simplifying the disbursement mechanism, whereby the release of the second tranche was based on a technical audit by independent firms rather than Use of Funds reports from SMCs. This approach facilitated the programme by compensating for the lack of reports from the SMCs. However, there were still delays with subsidies often not being received until well after the school year had ended.

4.07 By referring to the PAS Manual 2013 and by referencing the qualitative assessment of efficiency, the Evaluator rates this criterion as **Marginally Unsatisfactory** due to the inefficiencies that occurred at the project implementation level, the consequent delays, and implications for beneficiary schools.

Sustainability

4.08 The PCR rates sustainability of the project as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**. It states that GOH recognizes that the project aimed to achieve the objective of Education for All. The planned activities and their spin-offs were highly relevant at appraisal. The grant to alleviate the cost of basic education for families and the nutrition/health programme had a major impact on school attendance. However, these interventions were costly, and the national budget could not support them in the short term. These actions required support from financial backers over several years until the Government of Haiti can completely take over the reins the same applies to the training of student teachers.

4.09 The PCR also states that institutional strengthening requires long-term support. As of the end of Phase 1 of EFA, contrary to forecasts, the DAA is unable to single-handedly take over the financial management and procurement processes. Consultants needed to be assigned to the department to train agents as part of a concrete plan involving assessments and preparing for a gradual takeover. However, this coexistence was not easy due to senior management not getting involved in monitoring the strengthening process.

4.10 The PCR highlighted that the renovation work and supply of equipment could only create a lasting impact if accompanied by support for management and maintenance, and if the necessary financial resources were made available otherwise there would be a risk that the equipment may be damaged through misuse or poor maintenance.

4.11 The AR indicates that investment in education has a substantial impact on poverty reduction in the short, medium, and long term. GOH's ability to garner resources from EFA, FTI, EGRO is considered very high and therefore, this donor funding can assure sustainability because these financial resources can help to continue the activities initially funded by the project.

4.12 Based on the previous, the Evaluator rates Sustainability as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**, which concurs with the PCR rating.

Borrower Performance

4.13 The PCR rates the performance of the Borrower/Implementation Agency as **Satisfactory**; the PCR stated that the tuition subsidy and school feeding programmes had support at the highest level of government with the President expanding the tuition subsidy programme to a nationwide level and initiating legislation to fund both programmes. The Ministry of Finance provided satisfactory support to the project and was flexible and committed, demonstrating their willingness to process the additional grant funding for the project.

4.14 After a slow start, project officials were able to establish routines that allowed for the completion of project activities. The PCU kept satisfactory records of beneficiaries, even though data was generally not disaggregated by sex. The Comite de Pilotage did not function as planned, and only a few meetings were held. There were major delays in satisfying conditions precedent which caused delays in starting the project. The Evaluator rates the Borrower's performance as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**, due to the delays in meeting grant effectiveness requirements.

CDB Performance

4.15 The PCR provides a self-assessment rating of CDB’s performance as **Satisfactory**. CDB recognized its shortcomings in relation to language and limited human resource capacity, and therefore extended its partnership with the WB to supervise project activities on its behalf. A strong collaborative relationship was developed.

4.16 The primary supervision of the project was ensured by WB with CDB supporting through supervision visits and engagement with WB. Based on this, the evaluator confirms the rating of **Satisfactory**.

5. OVERALL PERFORMANCE

5.01 The PCR rates the overall performance of the project as **Satisfactory**. The Evaluator rates the overall project performance as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**. This rating is based on an arithmetic average of the total scores from separate assessments of the four core criteria: Relevance (Highly Satisfactory); Effectiveness (Unsatisfactory); Efficiency (Marginally Unsatisfactory); and Sustainability (Satisfactory).

5.02 Details of the ratings and justification for differences between the PCR and Evaluator are in table 4 below.

TABLE 4: SUMMARY RATINGS

Criteria	PCR ⁸	OIE Review	Reason, if any, for Disagreement/Comments
Relevance	High Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	
Effectiveness	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Efficiency	Satisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	Inefficiencies in the implementation of the Project resulted in delays and implications for the beneficiaries.
Sustainability	Marginally Unsatisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	
Composite (Aggregate) Performance Rating	Satisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Marginally Satisfactory	Delays in meeting grant effectiveness requirements.
CDB Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Quality of PCR	N/A	Satisfactory	

6. Lessons

6.01 The PCR identified six lessons learnt from the implementation of the project, these lessons are as follows:

- (a) Demand-driven interventions can work well in achieving greater access to education and offer good opportunities for upscaling project activities in countries where the provision of

⁸ PPES scores and ratings used in PCR and PSRs to be converted to PAS 2013 scores and ratings, using the equivalence matrix in the relevant PAS 2013 Manual (Public Sector Investment Lending and TA; PBL; CSP).

public services is limited. With the dominance of private schools in Haiti, the payment of primary school tuition and providing school meals removed two of the most critical obstacles students faced to attending class. Allowing schools to nominate children for the tuition subsidy proved to be an effective way to tap the excess demand for primary education and to target poorer students.

- (b) Donor coordination was critical in a fragile state whose institutions may not have been able to programme efficiently all of the aid available to them. In EFA-1, one of the most important contributions was the coordination of the large number of resources available to education in Haiti. EFA-1 was able to take on additional donor funding that was necessary to upscale the successful tuition subsidy and nutrition programmes. Haiti's education sector might not have been able to effectively absorb the large influx of resources were it not for the design of EFA-1.
- (c) Achieving quick wins in a fragile state may have necessitated PCU-oriented project management. GOH wanted quick wins in the education sector in part to demonstrate that the government could deliver important social services; however, its institutions were weak. With Haiti also highly susceptible to natural disasters, it made sense to concentrate project management in a small unit of experienced, well-qualified professionals that was well-positioned to continue project activities. The PCU was also key in effectively channeling the additional resources that were available to the project from other donors after the earthquake. However, as was the case in EFA-1, it is essential that the PCU remain under the authority of the Ministry and follow the Ministry's strategy and objectives.
- (d) Outsourcing the provision of basic services was seen to be an effective form of implementation in a fragile state. EFA-1 expanded the use of NGOs for school nutrition and SMC capacity building and partnered with non-public schools to improve school access. GOH itself could not have as effectively delivered these basic education and nutrition services.
- (e) Provision of school nutrition was important to encouraging attendance. Focus groups of parents reported that the provision of early morning snacks and lunches at school was one of the main reasons that they sent their children to school. Punctuality and regularity therefore increased. Some parents said that on particular days of the week, the school lunch is the only balanced meal their children eat.
- (f) If capacity cannot be built as quickly as planned, other capacities in-country may be available to implement project activities. When the SMCs could not provide the use of funds reports on which the tuition subsidies were based, the Project was able to rely on local technical audit capacity to verify compliance with the subsidy programme. The establishment of a PCU staffed with capable consultants (as part of the 2009 restructuring) greatly boosted Project implementation. More importantly, after the earthquake that devastated MENFP, the PCU served as a critical source of capacity and performed important ministerial tasks that kept Project activities moving forward.

7. COMMENTS ON PCR QUALITY

7.01 The Evaluator rates the PCR quality as **Satisfactory**. The PCR provides valuable information on project design and implementation, and several important lessons learned from the project are also identified.

8. DATA SOURCES FOR VALIDATION

8.01 The primary sources for this validation exercise were CDB's First Appraisal Report (BD21/08);

Additional Grant (Paper BD 21/07 Add. 1) CDB's PCR; 2007-2014 Project Supervision Reports; and CDB's Registry files regarding the project.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OIE FOLLOW-UP

9.01 No follow-up for OIE is required.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE



**PROJECT COMPLETION VALIDATION REPORT
EDUCATION FOR ALL PROJECT – HAITI**

There is generally congruence with the assessment and findings of the Project Completion Validation Report. OIE has incorporated the comments of the SSD into the Report and where any differences in scores were observed, justifications provided were acceptable.

Both the PCR team and OIE agree that there were some valuable lessons learnt from the implementation of this project, which are already incorporated in the design and implementation of the current projects under implementation and are also informing the appraisal of projects under consideration.